Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1951

Budget Builders, Inc. v. State Tax Commission :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Don J. Hanson; C. M. Gilmour; Leland S. McCullough; Attorneys for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Budget Builders, Inc. v. State Tax Comm., No. 7607 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1369

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Case No. 7607

IN THE SUPRE,ME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Dissolution of
BUDGE·T BUILDERS, INC.,
a corporation
BUDGET BUILDERS, IN·C., a
corporation,
AppelZant,

vs.
STATE TAX COMMI·S SION,
Respondent.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Dissolution of
BUDGE·T BUILDERS, INC.,
a corporation
BUDGE·T BUILDERS, IN:C., a
corporation,

Case No.
7607

vs.
STATE TAX

C0~1:MISSION,

Respondent.
BRIEF OF. RESPONDENT

'S.TATEMEN·T OF ·THE CASE
This is an 'appeal from a judgment of the District
·Court in ·and for Salt Lake: County dismissing the
amended Petition of the BUDGET BUIL.D·ERS, INC.
for a Show Cause ·Order against the UTAH STATE
TAX COMMIS:S:IO·N to show why the corporation should
not be allowed to be dissolved,- and praying that th-e
District Court determine the tax liability of the cor'
poration .to the state, ·and that it be adjudged no tax
liability exists, and that the corporation he ordered disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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solved an·d for general relief. ;The Petition was filed
in Dissolution p·roceedings instituted by BUDGET
BUILDERS, INC., then p·ending in the District Court.
The -amended p·etition is set out on Pages 17 to 3'4, inclusive, of the T'ranscript, and is again set out in a general
way on Piages 4 to 10 of the Ap·pellant's Brief herein.
:The judgment of J)ismis·sal was pursuant to a
Motion to Dismiss file-d by the UTAH STATE 'TAX
COMMISSION, which is set out on Page 3-7 of the
Transcript and is again set out on Page 10 of the Ap~pel
lant's Brief. The judgment of Dismissal appears on
Page 38 of the Transcript, and again on Pages 10 and
11 of the Appellant's Brief herein. In view of the fact
that these pleadings are set out in the transcript and
again in Ap·pellant's Brief, no purpose can he served
by the Respondent again setting them out herein. Suffice is it to sa.y that the amended Petition was dismissed
by the District Court upon the grounds that the Court
''does not have jurisd~ction to de'termine the corporation
franchis-e tax liability of the Petitioner to the State of
Utah, and it further appearing to the Court that the
foregoing Pe~ition fails to show facts upon which the
relief prayed for can be grante·d'' Tr. 38.
More significant tha~ what is alle~ed in the runended
Petition is what the amen·ded Petition fails to allege.
Section, 104-62-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as
amended, the section of the law that the Court is called
upon to interp·ret in this ease, p·rovides in part:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'' * * * If the said. 'state tax eomml'SSion
refuses or fails to give such a tax cle·arance
within ninety (90) ·days from the request th·e:refor
by the dissolving corporation and from the date
of the filing of a verified cop·y of the Resolution
hereinafter referred to, the court may, upon request from the -corporation, or upon its own
motion, require the tax commission to app:e:ar
in the proceeding and show cause, at a time appointed by the ~ourt, why the corporation should
not he dissolved. * * * The corporation shall
furnish to the secretary of state :and to the
state tax commission a verified cop·y of the
Resolution showing the date wh·en the c-orporation resolved to cease doing business.''* * *
The amended Petition of the Appellant herein does
not, at any time, allege that the BUDGE~ BUILDERS,
INC. filed a verified copy of the Resolution of Dissolution with the Utah State T'ax ·Commission, or with the
Secretary of State, nor does the amended Petition allege
that the dissolving corporation ever made a request
upon the State Tax Commission for a

T~ax

Clearance.

The amended Petition does set out a letter by an
employee of the Auditing Division of the State Tax Commission to THOMAS & ARMSTRONG, Attorneys at
Law, and the attorneys for the Appellant herein, advising that proposed corporation franchise tax delinquency
assessments for the years 1948 and 1949 were mailed to
the BUDGET BUILDERS, INC. on August 25, 1950,
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and that upon payment of these dHficie·ncies, the Tax
Commission would be in a \position to.issue a Tax Clearance Certificate. The Ap~pellant assumes a fact, which
is in issue in this App~eal, that said letter constituted
a refus1al on the p~art of the State Tax Commission to
issue a Tax Clearance to the BUD·GET BtiTLDERS,
INC. The State· Tax Commission denies, for reasons
that will he discussed later in this Brief, that such a
letter constitutes a refusal of the State Tax Commission
to issue a Tax Clearance Certi~cate.
While the question of whether or not the proposed
corporation franchise tax delinquency assessments for
the years 1948 and 1949 are correct or lawful is not
involved in tlris Ap·p~eal, the amended Petition of the
Appellant herein fails to allege any violations of the
law in the: manner of setting up the proposed deficiency
assessments. The p~etition does give notice that it disagrees with the conclusions of the Commission as to
whether certain income is income of the ~orporation
9r income of the individuals, but that fact in and ofits'elf
~does not make the tproposed deficiency unlawful.
It is the position of the Respondent, the State T'ax
~Commission, that the District Court did not err in dismissing the am'ended Petition of the Appellant, a:t least
not under the facts set out in the amended P'etition, and
we will now p~roceed to give the rea:sons why the decision
of the Court should he· upheld:
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ARGUl\IENT

1. The District Court lacks jurisdiction to hea,r wnd
deternli-ne the

v~ l~ability

:of ,the bovrporation.

It is the contention of the Ap·pellant herein th~at Section 104-62-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943, -as amended,
confers the ~ower to determine the corporation franchise
tax liability of the corporation, under the cir;cumstances
set out in its Petition upon the District Court. It is to be
noted that the Appellant would have the District Court
inquire into the income of the corporation, ap~pJy the
corporation franchise tax rate, as set out by the L~egis
lature, to that amount of income vvhich the District
Court found to be tfl.Xlable and by such means to arrive
at the corporation franchise tax "Owed by the corp·oration. In other words, the District Court, under the circumstances set out in the Appellant's Petition, would
take over and perform all the functions ordinarily performed by the State Tax Commission in determining
the corporation franchise tax liability of corporations.
While the Respondent does not believe this is the
correct interpretation of Section 104-62-6, if such be the
correct interp·retation, then that portion of the law confirming such p·ower on the District Court must fail for
the reason that it vests powers in the District Court
which may only be vested in the State :Tax Commission
under the organic law of this state.
Article 13 of the Constitution of the State of Utah
deals with Revenue an·d Taxation. Any reading of the
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
entire s·~tion can only lea:d to the :conclusion that, except
for the delegation of authority to impose taxes for local
purposes in counties, cities, towns or other municipalities, the p·eople intended to vest the administration of
the tax laws of this state in the State 'Tax Commission.
Article 13, Seetion 11 of the Constitution of the State
of Utah provides:
''There shall be a state tax commission consisting of four members, not more than two of
whom shall belong to the same political party.·
·The members of the Commission shall be appointed by the Governor, by and ·with the consent of
the :s.enate, for such terms of office ~as may be
provided by law. The state tax commission shall
administer a.nd supe•rvise the tax laws of the
state. It shall assess mines and public utilities
and adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment of property among the sev-eral counties.
It shall have such other p~ow-eTs of original assessment as the Legislature may p1rovide. Under such
regulations in such cases and within such limitations 'as the L·egislature may prescribe, it shall
est~ablish systems of public accoun~ing, review
proposed bond issues, revise the tax levies and
budgets of local governmental units, and equalize
the assessment and valuation of p·roperty within
the counties. The duties imposed upon the State
Board of Equalization by the Constitution and
laws of this state shall he p:erformed by the state
tax commission.
"In each co.unty of this state there shall be
a Comity Board of Equalization consisting of the
B·oard of County Cqmmissioners of said. county.
The County Boards of Equalization shall adjust
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
and equalize the valuation and assessment of the
real and personal property within their resp·ective
counties, subject to such regulation and control
by the state tax commission as may be prescribed
by law. The sta.te tax commission an·d the County
Boards of Equaliz,ation shall each h!av.e such other
powers as may be prescribed by the Legislature."
The Constitution having delegated authority to
administer and supervise the tax laws of the State of
Utah to the state tax commission, and interpretation
of Section 104-62-6 which would allow the District ·Court
to exercise this function would be to permit the Judicial
Branch of Government to encroach up.on and perform
the duties 'vhich have been delegated to the Executive
Branch of Government.
As was said on Page 382 in Kimball v. Grantsville
City, 19 Utah, Page 369, which case involved the power
of the Legislature to fix the boundaries of Grantsville
City for taxation purposes:
"The powers of the state government were,
by the organic law, divided into three distinct
departments - the Legislative, Executive and
Judicial; and no person or p·ersons, whose duty
it is to exercise the functions of one department,
can exercise any power belonging p·roperly to
either of the others, excep·t in cases expressly
authorized by the· ·Constitution. The legislative
power was veste-d exclusively in the legislature,
and it is within its sphere to make the laws for
the government of the state. The power to execute
the laws was r:eferred to the E:x!ecutive Dep·artment, and the power to declare what are the laws
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to the Judiciary. The ~dep~artments ar.e· all upon
the same place, are all coordinated bran:ches of
the state government, each absolute within its
sphere, ·except as limited O:r controlled by the
constitution of this. state or of the United S.tates.
The apportionment of distinct power to one department of itself implies an inhibition against its
exercise by either of the other dep~artments * * •
s·o, like·wise, it is within the, power of the legislature to establish ~administrative hoards in local
jurisdictions, and distribute to them such administrative functions, as, in its judgment, it may
deem necessary and convenient for the public
welfare, and may re'tain others of such functions
to be exercised by the central power, and such
arrangements it may change from time to time, as
in its discretion the public welfare may require.''
Quoting Chief Justice Gibson in Kirby vs. Shaw,
19 Pa. St. 258, discussing the problem of taxationChief Justice Bartch goes on to say on Page 391:
''If equality were practicable, in what branch
of the government would power to enforce it
reside~ Not in the Judiciary, unless it were
coiUpetent to set aside a law free from collision
with the Constitution, because· it seemed unjust.
It would interpos·e only by overstepping the limits
of its sphere; by arrogating to itself a power
beyond its providence; by producing intestine
discord; and by setting an ·example which other
organs 'Of the governme.nt might not be slow to
follow. It is its peculiJar duty to keep the first
lines of the Constitution clear; and not to stretch
its rpower in order to correct LegislativH or Executive abus:es. Every branch of the government,
the Judiciary included, :does injustice from which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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there is no r·emedy, because everything human
is imperfect. The sum of the matter is, that the
taxing po,ver must he left to that p~art of the
government which is to exercise it."
But, the appellant may argue that inquiring into the
income of the corporation 'and ·deriving the tax to be
paid by the corporation under the provisions of the
corporation franchise tax law, as p-rovided by the Legislature, is not an administrative function.
In the Crystal Car Liwe vs. State ~ax. Commission,
(Utah) 174 Pac. 2d, 984, the Court h~ad under consideration a statute providing that the p;roperty 'Of car ~and trans'!"
portation companies, and Olp!erated ·as a unit in more than
one county, either by the ·owners or someone else, must
be ·assessed by the state tax commission. :The objection
was made that the statute was ineffective because the
Legislature must provide the formula by w:q.ich .the average number of cars within the state might be· ·ascertain·e·d,
and the formula for the valuati'On of such cars.

The court in ·defining the administrative powers of
the state tax commission on Page 989 said :
''Our constitutional provision that th.e L·egislature shall provide, by law, a. uniform and equal
rate of taxation 'On all tangible p·rop·erty, and
shall prescribe by l~aw such regulations as 'shall
s-ecure a just valuation for taxation of such property' does not mean that the Legislature must
p~r.escribe the formula which must be used by the
tax commission in arriving at its assessment.
The ,ascertaitnment of the 1amo·unt of p~rop·erty to
be taxed, aJn;(l itl~ ·v,alue is ·p'noperly ant. a,dministnaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tive fumction. It is sufficient if the Legislature
!provides the p·roperty shall be taxed, and fixes
the rate at w·hich it may be: ·taxed.
The corporation franchis.e tax laws of this state have
p~rovided for a tax on tbe~ net income of ·corporations in
Sec. 80-13-7, Utah ·Code Annotate:d, 19~43, as amended. In
the sections following 80-13-7, it has provided in detail
how the net income of the corporation is :arrive·d at. By
Sections 80-13-2 and 80-13-3, thH L,egislature has p·rovided
the rate at which such income is taxable. 'The act of
de·termining the amount of tax is merely a matter of
applying the procedure and method outlined by the
Legislature. Every question which can aris·e, and the
only question which has arisen in this matter, is a
question of fact and not one of law. That is, whether
or not the income was income of the corporation. It is
ap·parent, therefore, that such 1an op·eration is ministerial
or administrative and ralls within the . Constitutional
limitation ·set out above, proiViding that the taxes shall be
''administered ~and supervised'' by the state tax commission.
This court has held that . a legislative attempt to.
vest the adm~istr~ation of ·the tax law of this state in
any body other than the state tax commission is contrary to· the seetion of the Constitution set out above.
In Bt·ate Ex Rel, ·Public Service C·ommission, et al.
v ..Southern· facific· Comp,arny, et al., 95 Utah 84, the
Court had unde·r consideration a statute requiring annual
reports by p~ublic utilities to the P'ublic Service
Com,
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mission, 'vhich :reports were to be used by the state tax
commission as a valuation basis for ass:essment of
utilities. The following app·ears in the syllabus of th~at
case:
''The statute reqmr1ng annual reports by
public utilities to be made to the Public Servi·ce
Commission and r-equiring the commission to
make a record of valuation of utility companie·s,
and Statute requiring state tax commission to
accept, for tax purposes, valuation re:corded hy
the comm.iS'sion in its record of valuation, constituted a Legislative attempt to compel th-e state
tax commission to use the same valuation basis
for tax assessment of utilities as use for rate
fixing purposes, which might under some circumstances ·be different from the value of utilities' property in money, contrary to the requirement of the Constitution. R. S. 1933- 76-4-21, as
amended, and 21X, as added, by L.aws 1937, c.
87, 80-5-43X, added by laws 1935, c. 82 as aln·ended
by laws 1937, c. 100; Const. Art. 13; amended in
1930."
In the case of Natiovnal Tunnel and Mines Company
vs. Industrial C·ommission, et ~al, 99 Utah 39. The case
had before it a proceeding under the Industrial Commission Act. ·The Industrial Commission has ordered,
among other things, the payment of co~ntrihutions to the
Unemploym~nt ·Compensation Fund. ·This order was set
aside for the reason that the .contributions required
under the Act was a tax and that, therefore, the Industrial Commission had no power to issue such an order.
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True, the Act its·elf Specifically p·rovided that the state
tax commission shall collect. ·all contributions under the
Act, but Chief Justice Moffitt, speaking for the majority
of the Court, had this to say, on Page 52:
''Constitutional p·rovisions must be consi·dered 'as limitations on legislativ.e power where
there is language of limitation or exception.
L·egislative power over taxation is plenary, ex. pept where limit·ations or exceptions are expressed
in the Basic Law. 'The tprovisions of :s;ection 11
of the State Constitution specifically vests the
power of administering and supervising the tax
laws of the state in the state tax commission.
Therefore, that specific provision must be considered as a limitation on the power of the Legislature to place the administering and supervising power in any other officer or commission.
State vs. Southern Pacific Company, 95 Utah
84, 79 P. 2d 25. ''
Se~tion

9· (C) sp~ecifically provides that ''the
state tax commission shall collect all contributions under this Act.'' ·Section 14 (B) provides,
inte·r alia ''If, after due notice, any ·employer defaults in any payment of contributions or in~erest
thereon, the amount due shall be -c-ollected by civil
action in the name· of the state· tax commission*·* *
''The state tax commission is speeifically
charged with the res.porrsibility of collecting the
tax, and when someone defaults then the tax
commission is to · start a civil action. The state
tax commission is to determine against whom
they shall proceed and who is liable for the p~ay
ment of contributions. This is the function conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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teinplate·d when th;e· constitutionnnl amendment
1vas ~adopted placing upon the tax commi'S'Sion
the burden to 'administer and supervise' the tax
laws.''
Counsel in Point Two of his :argument asserts that
the legislature by Section 104-62-6 intende·d in dissolution proceedings, to set out another administrative p·rocedure in addition to the procedure set out in Sections
80-13-36 to se:ction 80-13-48, Utah Code Annotate-d, 1943,
as amended.
The argument contains within itself its own answer
in this: If the procedure is in ract administrative, then
it must fail for the reason that the administration of the
tax law as w.e· have seen, is vested in the tax commission
by the Constitution and not in the ·district court.
.Appellant's argument in Point Three of its Brief
is a hit confusing 'also. It is contended that if the proposed deficiency assessment of the state tax commission
had become final, then, the district court would have no
power to review the decision of the commission; but
that, the decision not having become :final, the District
Court may step in an·d make the mathemati,cal computation of the franchise tax liability in place of the
state tax commission. ·Such a position is just the reverse
of the great bulk of authority defining the power of the
Judicial Branch of government to review administrative
action.
''Although it is subject to a number of qualifications, the broad principle that the decisions of
administrtatiVie agencies charge·d with the assessment of taxes or the corre.ction and review of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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original tax assessments are not subject to collateral tax, but are final and conclusive on the
court and hence preclude judicial redress of allegedly excessive or illegal assessment, is frequently
recognized by the Courts. * ·* *
''Even under circumstances where the right
of 'a taxp~ayer to se~ure judicial redress. with
respect to allege,dly excessive or illegal assessment is assumed, the view has been expressed
that one seeking redress must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the administrative officials have erred since otherwis.e, it is said, 'an
appeal to' the courts would merely provide a substitution of the courts olpinion for that of the
administrative agency.
' 'The broad principle that the· ·decision of
administrative officials relating to the assessment
of taxes 'are final and ~onclusive so as to prevent
judicial redress for an ·excessive or illegal,ass·essment is· subject to a limitation or qualification
with respect to the manner in which the officials
acted in arriving at the challenged assessm·ent.
* * * ·The p-recise. terms used to describe the kind
of conduct by administrative offici,als which will
result in holding that their action is not conclusiv.e
and. final but is subject to review by the courts
are many and variou:s. Those most frequently
invoke·d heing fraudulent, or disclosing or resulting in fraud, arbitrary, cap·ricious, unwarrant~
.able, corrupt, discriminatory and ·inequitable.''
Sections 770, 771, Pages 6-98, 6·99 and 700, Vol.
51, Ameri,can Jurisprudence on Taxation.
Section 80-13-48, Utah Code Annotated, 1943., provides:
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''No court of this state, except the Suprem~e
Court, shall have jurisdiction to review, revers.e
or annul any decision of the tax commission, or
to suspend o:r delay the op·eration or .execution
thereof.''
If we are to adopt the interpretation of 104-62-6,
contended for by the ap!pellant, we would come up with
the absurd result that any district court of the state of
Utah might review the action of the tax commission at
~any time before the decision becomes final, but th~at the
Supreme ·Court might not do so until after the ·decision
had become final. Also, the district court might find it is
reversing a decision of the tax commission, when in fact
there was no ·decision to be reviewed. It is· submitted
:section 80-13-48 is merely a legislative reinstatement of
the fundamental constitutional law of this state, that
no court except the Supreme Court shall h~ave jurisdiction
to review, reverse or annual any decision of the tax commission, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution
there·of.
The Appellant's argument in Point One of his
Brief, that if the district court does not hav:e jurisdiction
to hear and determine the tax li~ability of the corp·oration, the tax commission could, by refusing to give a
tax clearance, stop· the wheels of justice and cause dissolution V'roceedings to stand still, presup·poses that
there is no remedy ·available to force the tax commission
to make such a determination and give a tax clearance,
should the ·dissolving corporation be entitled to a tax
clearance. It should be pointed out that the tax comisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sion is not in this case arguing that the district court has
no power to o:vder the· tax commission to give a tax clearance, hut is. ~arguing that the district court may not itself go through the mechanical p·roce'dure of arriving at
the corporation's f:vanchise tax.
Section 4, Article 7 of the Utah State Constitution
confers on the Supreme ·Court original jurisdiction "to
issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.''
Section 7, Article 7 of the Constitution confers upon
the district court "power to issue Writ of H~aheas Corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, p~rohibition
and other rights necess~ary to carry into effect their
orders, judgments and decrees.''
If the tax commission arbitrarily refus.es to make a
determination of the corporation franchise tax, which
may be owing by the corporation, the mandamus would
be available to compel the tax commission to make· such a
dete·rmination and to issue a tax clearance when the court
determines that any taxes due from the corporation had
been p·aid.
''Although courts have no inherent authority
to levy, assess, or collect taxes, there are many
stages in the taxing p.rocess ~at. which judicial
intervention may occur. Thus, the writ of mandamus will lie to eoropel the performance by public officials of ministerial duties respecting taxes,
such as the dut! to levy, ~assess, ·an·d collect taxes,
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to execute the tax 'deeds, or to carry out the directions of 'a Board of Equaliz~ation. '' S·ection
46, Page 76, Vol. 51, Am·erican Jurisp:rudence on
Taxation.
More will b·e said he·reafter concerning authority
of the Court to require th-e tax commission to issue a
tax clearance when it has be·en determine:d b;y the court
that the dissolving eorporati'on is entitle:d to such u clearance.
It is submitted, therefore, th,at if the· App·ellant is
correct, th·at ·section 104-6.2--6, Utah ·Code Annotaterd,
1943, as amended,. confers jurisdi;ction upon district
courts to make the mathematical computation of the
corpo·ration franchise taxes due from dissolving corporations, then, that part of the statute which ·delegate·s
such ~authority must fail for the. reason that it vests in the
judicial arm of the government a function which inherently belongs to the Executive arm, and which is, by
the Constitution of this state vested in the tax pommisSlon.

2. T.he Legislature did not intend, to ves:t dist:ric:t
courts w·ith jurisdiction to determine corporation franchise t.axes.
As we have seen in the p~re-ceding ·section, an interpretation of Section 104-.62·-6, which would confer the
administration of the t'lx luw of the state 'Of Ut~ah up·on
the ·district court, would render that part of. the· statute
void. ~uch an interpretation should be avoi·ded. The
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statute is reasonably suscep~tible of a !construction which
will give effeet to the law, and ye~t not render it unconstitutional.
''In the construction of statutes, the courts
st~art with the assurnJprtion that the legislature intended to enact an effectiv.e law, and the legislature is not presumed to have taken a vain thing
in the enactment of a statute * * * Accordingly,
if :a statute is fairly susceptible of two construCtions, one of which will give effect to the act,
while the other will defeat it, the fonner construction is preferr·ed. A statute will not be given ~a
construction by which its effectiveness will be
seriously imposed, where a different construction
is possible. This r11:le may be applied even though
the latter construction is the more natural one.''
Section 357, Page 358, 50 American Jurisprudence on 'Statutes.
In constructing Section 104-62-6, the court should
keep in mind, not only the constitutional limitations, but
also the p·rovisions of title SO-Chapter 13, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, which chapter provides for the corporation franchise tax, and the manner in which it shall
be administered.
''Under the rule of statutory constru,ction
of statutes in pari nateria, statutes are not to be
consider~ed as isolated fragments of law, but as a
whole, or as parts of a great, connected, homogenius system, or a single and complete statutory
arrangement. ·such statutes are considered as if
they consti tut~ed hut one act, so that sections of
one act may be considered as though they were
parts of the other act, as far as can reasonably
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be done. Indeed, as a general rule, where legislation dealing with ·a \particular subject consists.
of a system of related general p·rovisions indicative of a settled policy, new en·actments of a fragmentary nature on that subject are to be taken as
intended to fit into the existing system ·an·d to be
carried into effect conformably to it, and the:y
should be so construed as. 'to harmonize the gene·ral
tenor or p·urport of the system and make the
scheme consistent in all its p•arts and uniform in
its operation, unless a different purpose is shown
plainly or with irresistable clearness. It will be
assumed or presumed, in the, absence of words
speeif~cally indicating the contrary that the legislature did not intend to inno:vate on, uns.ettle,
disregard, ·alter or violate a general statute or
system of statutory p~rovisions, the entire subject
matter of which is not directly or necessarily involved in the act.'' Section 349, Pag,e 345, 50
American Jurisprudence on Statutes.
Section 80-5-46, Utah ·.Code Annotated, 1943, wherein
the general powers and duties of the stat-e tax commission
are set out, confers vast powers.- of administr~ation of the
tax laws up.on the state tax commission, in,cluding the
power to require such information from corlporations as
shall he necessary for the tax commission to determine
the taxes which might be owed by said corporations.
:s:ection 80-13-51, Utah Code Annot·ated, 1943, provides:
'' T'he tax commissi·on shall administer and
enforce the tax herein imposed (corporation
franchis~e tax) and for th·at purpose it may divide
the state into districts, in e~ch of which a branch
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office of the tax commission may be maintained,
provided that in no ease shall a. eormty be divided
in forming a district."
Seetion 80-13-36, U:tah Code Annotated, 1943, confers the power upon fu,e tax -commission to determine
whether or not there is a deficiency and to notify the
taxp·ayer of the details of the deficiency, and the manner
of computing the tax.
Section 80-13-39, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, confe.rs
powe·r on the tax commission to redetermine· the amount
of the deficiency. Section 80-13-46 provides :
''Every decision ·of the tax commission shall
be in writing, and notice thereof shall he mailed
to the taxpayer within ten days, -and all such decisions shall beeome final upon the expiration of
thirty days :after notice of such decision shall have
been mailed to the tax'P'ayer, unless p~roceedings
are thereafter taken for review by the ·Supreme
Court upon writ ·of certiorari, as hereinafter provided, in which case it shall heeome final, (1)
when affirmed or modified by the judgment of
the Supreme Court; (2) if the Supreme Court
remands the case to the tax commission for r~e
hearing, when it is thereafter determined as hereinabove p~rovided with resp~eet to the initial proceedings. ' '
Section 80-13-49, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides:
''No court of this state, except the Supreme
Court, shall have jurisdiction to revi~e·w, reverse
or annul any decision of the tax commission, or
to suspend or delay the operation or execution
thereof.''
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These statutes are only the nn~e·s in which the conflict
with Appellant's interp·retation 'Of s:ection 104-6·2-'6 is
most 'apparent and violent. Innumerable other inconsistencies could be pointed out.
It is submitted that an interp·retation may be m·ade
of Section 104-62-6 which ·does not conflict with the constitution or with the statutes of the corporation franchise
tax set out above, and that such interpretation is reasonable and was, in f'act, intended by the legislature.
Under the provisions of Section 104-6·2-6, the tax
commission had ''ninety (90) days from the request
therefor hy the dissolving corporation, :and from the
date of the filing of a verified copy of the resolution,'' in
which to furnish a tax clearan,ce. Under the p·rovisions
of :s:ection 80-13-36, Utah ·Code Annotated, 1943, the tax
commission may determine if there is a deficiency, which
deficiency becomes. final unJess ''Within sixty (60) days
after such notice is mailed, the taxpayer may file a p·etition with the tax commission for a redeteTmination of
the def~ciency. ''
Within a p·eTiod of ninety (90) days from the filing
of a request for a tax clearance, the tax commission has
time to examine the recor,ds of the· dissolving corp·oration, ·determine if there -is a ·deficiency, and set up a
deficiency which can become final within the same period,
provided no p·etition for a re-determination was filed.
It is not even uncon,ceiveable that the rpetition for a redetermination might be heard before the exp·iration of
the ninety (90) days.
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'The fact that the Legislature. p·rOvi·ded for such a
perio;d of time evidences its intent to allow the commis;sion time to make such a ·determination. To s·ay the
same thing in different words, it evidences an intent
by the Legislature that the ~tax commission should make
the ~actual computation oftaxes due from the corporation.
;The commission does not contend that the District
c.ourt might not require the tax commission to appear
before it at the end of ninety (90) days after a request
for a tax clearance has been filed, nor does the tax commission deny the authority of the district court to order
the tax commission to furnish a tax certificate, if the
district court finds that the commission refused to furnish a tax clearance without good reason. Indeed, it is
admitted that this authority is

~xpressly

conferred by

the statute. What ·determination then does the statute
~on template

the district court may make. Turning again

to the statute in question, we find that it provides in
part:
''The court shall thereupon determine the
t.ax liability of the corporation, and upon payment of any sums fou,nd by the court to be due to
the tax commission, the court shall order the
corp·oration dissolved. The tax liability of the
corporation shall be determined as of the date
the corpor~ation formerly resolved in a 'proper
resolution to quit doing business as a corporation,
provided, however, that if a corporation does business other than in the normal course of liquidation, and winding up its. affairs, afte~r the date
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determined in said resolution, the t~ax li;ability of
said corporation sh·all be fixed as of the da;te the
corporation actually ~eased doing business.''
The important words in the statute are t:a;x lvability.
Determining the "tax liability" does not mean "determine the taxes.'' The first p·resum~es that the taxes
have already 'been determined and leaves only the question of what taxes are due. This is the determination
the Legislature inten.ded the district court to make. The
district court may determine what taxes the dissolving
corporation is liable for, not the taxes thems~elves, and
upon payment of the same, the -court may dissolve the
corporation. This meaning is further borne out by the
wording ''upon payment of any sums found by the court
to be due to the tax commission.'' This statement, likewise,_presumes the sums have already been determined,
and the court simply conditions the dissolution upon
iJ'ayment of the sums found to be· ·du.e. The power to be
exer~ised by the district court is ·s.imilar to that exercised
in State vs. .A.da County, D~airyma.n's Association
(Idaho) 159 Pacific 2d 219. The statute in tha.t case
provided that any court in which an action shall he commenced to enforce p:ayment of unemployme·nt excise taxes
''shall have jurisdiction to review and affirm, modify
or reverse su,ch assessments. ·The eourt shall make and
enter judgment for the runount f·ound due plus interest,
and penalty as provided in Section 7-3 of this act.'' The
court in that case said:
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"It is clear that what the district court is
given power to 'review and affirm, modify or reverse' in a case brought to collect the tax, is for
instance, whether a ·defendant empJoyer comes
within the provisions of the statute and, therefore,
required to pay the unemp~loyment excis,e, tax; the
number of employees on which 'the· tax must be
paid; the wages of such employee and kindred
matters. Neither the B'Oard nor the District 'Court
is given power to :assess in the sense of levying an
unemployment excise tax because the legislature
not only levied but fixed the amount of the tax,
* * * The Legislature eould not have· intended, by
making provisions for a review of the matters we
have just p1ointed 'Out, to make the district court
a fact finder or to vest it with power or any duty
to administer the law.''
1

·It is submitted that a reasonable construction of
the statute in question, and, indeed, the construction intended by the legislature itself does not compel or even
justify ia finding that the legislature intended to delegate
to the district court the power to actually make the
mathematical computation of corporation franchise
taxes, and thereby assess corporation franchise taxes,
in the ease of a corporation in :the process of dissolving.
3. The amewded Petition failed to state tax entitling
the Petitioner to the relief prayed.

Again quoting Section 104-62-6 in part. The statute
p~rovides:

''If the said state tax ~ommission refuses or
fails to give such tax clearance within ninety days
from the request theiefor by the dissolving corporation a;nd f~om the date of the filing of a veriSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fied copy of the ·resoltution hereinafter referred, vo,
the court may, upon request from the corporation
o:r upon its own motion, re~quire the tax commission to app.ear in the proceeding and show cause
at a time appointed by the court, why the corporation should not be allowed to be dissolved * * *
The corporation shall furnish to the secretary of
state and to the state tax .c,ommis.sion a ve·rifie;d
copy o.f the resolution showing the date when the
corporation resolved to cease ·doing husiness. ''
Thre:e things are necessary to give the ·dissolving
petitioner a right to relief prayed for: (1) H:e must make
a request for a tax clearance. (2) He must furnish to
the tax commission a verified copy of the resolution to
dissolve. (3) The tax ·commission must for a P'Hriod of
ninety (90) days refuse to issue :a tax clearance.
The amended petition ·does not allege compliance of
any one of these conditions. Appellant ~ontends that
com'pli,ance is not necessary because he alleges the commission has refused to give a tax clearance. 'This argument must fail because the commission has not refused
to give a tax clearance, and because other conditions
must he .complied with. The commission must refuse for
a period of ninety (90) days to give a tax clearance· and
a verified copy of the resolution to diss·olve must be
furnished.

A. The Tax Commission has not refusedi to issue a
Tax Cle,arance.
From the allegations of the amended Petition, and
in the exhibits .attache~d thereto, it is appiarent th,at the
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tax commission set up a proposed tax deficiency, under
the corporation franchise tax law, and ·against the
BUDGET BUILDERS, IN·C. on August 25, 1950, Tr.
27. The deficiency itself was sent direct to the company's
office in ·Salt Lake City, Utah. On August 28, 1950, J. W.
Martell, an employee· of the commission, wrote to the
attorneys of BUDGET BUILDEDS, INC. and informed
the attorneys that on August 2·5, 1950, a proposed corporation franchise tax deficiency assessment for the
p·eriods 1948 and 1949 was mailed to the BUDGET
BUILDEDS, INC. The amount of the proposed deficiency was set out and the statement was made "upon
~payment ·Of these deficiencies * * * we will be in a position to issue a tax clearance.''
Viewed in the light of the circumstances surrounding
the writing of the letter, ·and read in conjunction with
the letter of August 25, 1950, Tr. 27, it is apparent that
the letter was not intended as a refusal to issue a tax
clearance certificate. No such request had ever been filed.
It was simply a letter to the company's attorneys informing the attorneys of the fact that a proposed deficiency had been set up. It had apparently con1e to the
attention of th·e commission from sonte source that the
c.orporation had filed a petition of dissolution, and the
tax commission was anxious to have any pending matters
cleared up. It is admitted that the wording of the letter
was somewhat unfortunate. Actually, the deficiencies
were not yet due, ~and the letter itself states that they
were "p·roposed" on August 25, 1950. The petitioner
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itself was a·dvised in the notice of the 25th that the deficiencies were only '''p-ropos.e-d adjustments.'' The lp!etitioner was also advised in the letter of August 25, 1950,
that he might file a petition for a redeterminati'On of
the proposed adjustments within sixty (60) days, that
full consideration would be given his petition and that
he would be given an opportunity for a hearing.
When the entire action is reviewed, it beeomes apparent that there was no arbitrary refusal ·of the -commission to give ·a. tax clearance and that circumstances might sway it from its stand. If, upon filing
of a petition for a redetermination, it has been found
that the pro:posed deficiencies were in error, the commission is entitled to the p:resump·tion that it would
have acted in accordance with law and caneeled the deficiency.
Where, upon request by the corporation, there being
no reason why a tax clearance should not be giv.en existing, the tax commis'Sion would have issued a tax clearance.
The commission should not be penalized simply because it goes further than is required hy law. The earnmission might have sat back and waited until the petitioner had filed a request for a tax clearance and might
be waiting still. Rather than do this, the commission
undertook to get all matters. between it and the corporaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion cleared up anticipating that the: corporation in the
near future would need a tax clearance. ·The letter to
the company's attorneys was me~rely intended to accomplish this.

B. T'he 'Bax ·Com·missvon must refuse to issue a
clearance for a period of ninety ( 90) days.

taa;

Appellant waited only about twenty-two (22) days
after the ·refusal, if, indeed, there was a refus'al, to file
its petition for an Order to Show Cause in this case. The
statute gives the commission ninety (90) days to furnish
the certificate. Even presuming the commission is
wrong in setting up the p·roposed deficiency, which has
not been shown, and presuming they refused to give a
tax clearance, which it did not, are we to presume also
that :the commission may not change its mind and issue
a tax clearance within the ninety (90) days.
As we have seen, the ninety (90) day period was
allowed for the tax commission to inquire into the tax
liability of the corporation, which the commission has
done here. The proposed :assessment would have become
final unless p·ro,ceedings were instituted for its review
within the ninety (90) day period, which is the very
thing the Legisl~ature contemplated so that the liability
would be fixed when the p~arties appear berore the District ·Court, ~and there would be no necessity for the court
to inquire into the tax itself.
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Authorities cited by the Ap~p~ellant to the effect that
a dem~d is not necessary when thH demand would be
useless are well taken, but they are not 'ap~p~li,Ca:ble
here.
I
In the authorities cite·d, a demand was all that was needed
to ripen the claim. Here the demand is needed to start
the ninety (90) day period running. The commission
might refuse for eighty-nine (89) days to is'Sue a tax
clearance, and issue the same on the ninetieth day without being in default under the statute. The ninety (90)
days does not run from the refus'al but does run from the
request.
Indeed, is not the request ·absolutely n~essary in
spite of any refusal by the tax commission to give the
District Court jurisdiction. Is not this situation similar
to the requirement that a party to a law suit m~ake a motion for a directed verdict or f.or a new trial before the
party could com'P'lain of the court refusal to grant a new
trial or a directed verdict. I doubt t:hat this ·court would
excuse a p·arty from m:aking a motion for a :directed
verdict, where the sallie was necessary, for reason that
the party 'assumed the court would deny that the motion,
if made, no matter how well taken this as.sump~tion might
have been.

C. The ·Conditions P'recedent pvrescribed by the stalute must be oomplied with.
As we have seen, the remedy the petitioner is seeking
is prescribed hy statute. ·Since it is p~rescribe~d by statute,
the conditions pr.eeedent upon which relief is predicated
must he absolutely complied with.
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''An action icannot properly be commenced
until all the essential elements of the cause are
in existence. That is, until the cause of action is
complete. It is necess'ary, also, that all valid condi:tions !preee~dent to the institution of the particular ·action, whether prescribed by "Statute, fixed by
an agreement of the parties, or implied by law,
be eomplied with, unless the· cond11;ct of the defendant is such as to defend the ·p,erformance
thereof or to ·excuse nonperformance. Such conditions may consist in the demand upon, or notice
to, the defendant, or the performance of some
other act* * *
''As an e)Cample of the necessity of confirmation to conditions prescribed by statutory law, the
necessity of presenting a claim against an estate
to the personal representative of the decedent
before bringing suit thereon may be cited. Municip~al ordinances also requires a condition precedent to bringing ·of an 'act upon claims of various courts against the municipality that the claim
first be presented to !proper municipal authorities
* * * '' Section 34, Page 426, 1 American Jurisprudence on actions.

I w this instance, A ppellarnt has failed to make a request for 'a t,ax clearomce, fu:rnish the

t~ax

commission

with a verified cop:y of the resolut·ion fJo dissolve, and
w·ait a period 0 f nilnety ( 90) ways before instituting this
proceeding. He has.,

there·for:e~,

not complied with the
I

conditions precedent to the bringing of his

~action,

must therefore fail.
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CONCLUSION
The appellant is claiming that a correct interp~re.ta
tion of Section 104-62-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
as amended, confers upon the district court authority to
levy and assess corporation franchise taxes. 'Ther.e is
something more involved than whether or not the rommission is afraid to try out this companies taxes in the
courts. To rephrase the words of the avpellant, the
people of the sovereign state, of Utah can demand something more than that company's tax liability be determined. They can ·demand that the tax liability he determined in the manner that they have directed by Section
11, Article 13 of th·e State Constitution, and that it be
determined in the manner prescribed by their legislature.
As has been pointHd out, the interp~retation which
the appellant asks this court to give the statute would
be a direct invasion of the Executive Branch of the
government by a Judicial body contrary to the general
princip~les of the constitutional law, and contrary to
Section 11, Article 13 of the Utah 'State Constitution.
Moreover, it would p~roduce irreconcilable conflicts he·tween Section 104-6·2-6 and the system pTovided by the
L:egislature in Chapter 13, Title 80, for as'Certaining porporation franchise taxes.
Nor does the language of statute compel or p·ermit
such an i:nter1_pretation but rather affirmatively shows
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that it was not the intent of the legislature to confer the
duti es of administering the tax law upon the district
1

court.
However, the court need not concern itself with the
interp,retation to be given the section, for reason that the
appellant h!erein has not complied with the conditions
pr~cedent to the granting of the relief he now seeks,
as set out hy the statute. Regardless of what relief it
may be within the jurisdiction of the district court to
g1ve.
We respectfully submit:
That the correct interpretation of Section 1046·2-6 does not confer authority upon the district court to
ascertain or comp~ute the corp·oration franchise taxes
owed by a corporation in dis'Solution proceedings.
1.

1

2. That if ·Section 104-62-6 ·does confer such authority, :then that p·art of the 'Statute: covering that authority
is of no force and effect since it confers upon the district
court authority to "administer

~and

supervise the tax

laws" in this state which 4rticle 13, Section 11, U t~1
S:tate Constitution confers upon the state tax commission.
3.

That, regardless of whether the district court
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tion franchis·e taxes in diss'Olution p~~oce·edings, the, Appellant herein is not entitled to :the, relief prayed for the
reason that he has not complied with th·e conditions se~t
out in the 'statute with which he must comply befor:e
being entitled to such relief.
Respectfully submitted,
DON J. HANSON,
C. M. GILMOUR
LELAND S. McCULL;OUGH

Atborneys for Respowdewt

UTAH ·s·TATE, TAX C.OMMISSION
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